Objectives
To determine whether New York City Transit has taken steps to implement safety and security in all its subway facilities, and whether safety and security equipment, such as cameras, help point intercoms, and customer assistance intercoms, is maintained (working and tested). The audit covered the period from September 2019 through March 2023.
About the Program
New York City Transit (Transit) is a Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) agency that manages, maintains, and runs subway service in New York City. Transit has 472 subway stations in four boroughs (Manhattan, the Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn) and facilities such as train yards, office buildings, and fleet support shops throughout New York City.
Security and safety, while managed together, have different points of focus. Security is concerned with protecting against harm caused by external factors, such as intrusion (a person entering an area where they are not wanted) or cyberattacks, while safety is focused on preventing incidents caused by physical hazards, such as through the use of physical barriers to protect against building or natural disasters. An example of security is the placement of security guards at rail yards, while safety includes approaches such as a better drainage system to prevent flooding.
At MTA Headquarters, the Chief Security and Safety Officer is mainly responsible for the policy aspect of safety and security across all MTA agencies, including Transit. MTA hires consultants or experts to conduct safety and security assessments, as well as to plan and provide guidance, to address issues such as crime and homelessness.
MTA’s Office of Security is responsible for protecting all MTA agencies, including Transit, with its implementation of security enhancements selected through its periodic All-Agency Electronic Security Program strategy (Security Strategy) using the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Threat and Vulnerability Risk Assessment (TVRA) process. The purpose of the Security Strategy is to ensure that there is a system-wide security program in place. MTA Construction & Development (formerly MTA Capital Construction) is responsible for implementing projects, such as those identified through the TVRA process, related to safety and security, including soliciting contractors. In some instances, temporary solutions are put in place if a project is not started. For mitigation measures, the Electronic Maintenance Division (EMD) may be responsible for installing equipment, such as cameras, for small or temporary projects.
As of May 2022, Transit had 1,075 closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems. These systems are used to observe incidents, deter unlawful activities, and improve safety in subway facilities. Laser Intrusion Detection Sensors are installed inside the tunnels. When an alarm is triggered, the Security Command Center (SCC) has a defined process to adjudicate why the alarm was triggered and what investigatory steps to take. Transit’s EMD is responsible for maintaining and repairing security equipment installed in subway facilities.
Key Findings
- Transit has taken steps to implement security in its subway facilities based on MTA’s Security Strategy. However, four of the 30 security projects we reviewed were delayed because there were no Small Business Mentoring Program (SBMP) contractors available to perform the work. Furthermore, five projects were not started within the time frame of the 2010–2014 and 2015–2019 MTA 5-Year Capital Programs, as planned. Instead, the projects started up to 7 years after the 2010–2014 Capital Program or 1 year after the 2015–2019 Capital Program.
- Transit’s safety and security equipment (e.g., CCTV systems, customer assistance intercoms, emergency alarms, fire alarms, and help point intercoms) is not always maintained as required. Only 916 of the required 1,061 preventive maintenances (PMs) we sampled were scheduled—145 PMs were not scheduled. In addition, documentation was not provided to support the completion of 610 of 916 scheduled equipment PMs. For example, one system with 119 cameras should have had scheduled PMs four times per year; however, there were no records for PMs performed during the same period.
- Although Transit prioritizes repairs of equipment defects over PMs, defects were not always addressed within the required time frame set by its procedures. The responses to the 141 electronic work orders (tickets) sampled from the period September 1, 2019 through July 21, 2022 were delayed by as much as 2 years beyond the required time frame. Transit officials attributed these delays to 11 major categories. The two largest categories were “Reason not indicated” and “Other Assistance” (53 and 41 tickets, respectively).
- For the 6-month period ended February 7, 2023, 25 of 80 (31%) alarm events we sampled were “False Alarm – Authorized Employee.” According to SCC officials, this occurs when employees do not use their access card when entering a subway tunnel. The SCC has instructed employees to always use their access card. However, they do not always comply with the policy.
- We sampled 50 of the 1,997 security equipment pieces with malfunctions (e.g., security gates and traffic-control arms). For 16 of the 50 (32%) malfunctions, tickets were open for more than 5 days, ranging from 7 to 142 days, including five tickets that were still open as of the date of our review (March 30, 2023).
Key Recommendations
- Revisit the list of SBMP contractors available to perform the work to ensure it is sufficient to meet the needs of the MTA Capital Program and address the risk to the system. If the contractor pool is not sufficient, develop an alternative plan to complete the capital projects.
- Document reasons PMs were not completed.
- Develop written policies and procedures for PMs that address how often PMs should be performed and how to document maintenance status and reasons (e.g., complete, incomplete, or not completed).
- Review outstanding tickets daily to assess why they remained open longer than the established response time and what corrective actions are required to decrease the time.
- Ensure compliance with the requirement that employees use their access card to enter and exit tunnels.
- Prioritize the repair of equipment malfunctions.
Carmen Maldonado
State Government Accountability Contact Information:
Audit Director: Carmen Maldonado
Phone: (212) 417-5200; Email: [email protected]
Address: Office of the State Comptroller; Division of State Government Accountability; 110 State Street, 11th Floor; Albany, NY 12236